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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

June 16, 19

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all remaining time yielded back?

Mr. BROOKE. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. BROOKE. I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. McGOVERN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, section 458 of H.R. 6689 amends the Foreign Gifts and Declarations Act to regulate the acceptance of gifts, including travel, food, and lodging, by Members and congressional staff from foreign governments. It applies as well to members of the executive branch.

This section was approved by the Foreign Relations Committee without hearings. It has not been reviewed by the Select Committee on Ethics or the Committee on Rules. Its purpose is commendable, but its methods appear to conflict with rule 43 of the Senate. And, what is more, its provisions could impose requirements upon the Members which are difficult, perhaps impossible, to comply with, and enforcement responsibilities upon the Ethics Committee which would be difficult to carry out.

I had thought to seek the Senate's support of an effort to strike this provision from the bill in order to give us time to work out a sensible solution. But I have discussed it with the distinguished floor manager and he has agreed to drop the matter in conference with the House if by then a satisfactory formulation is not agreed to by the Foreign Relations Committee and the Committees on Ethics and Rules. Between now and the conference, other Members also would be afforded an opportunity to be heard on the subject under this procedure. So, I hope the distinguished Senator from South Dakota will confirm my understanding that he is prepared to drop this section if before the conference we have not agreed upon an acceptable solution to the problem.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois states the understanding correctly. I agree with him that this complicated matter deserves further attention. Because the House approved a bill containing no provision on this subject, it should be possible for the Senate to recede in conference if by then we have not worked out a solution acceptable to the Committees on Ethics and Rules. I assure the Senator that we understand the problems this provision currently entails for the Members and the committee which he chairs, and I am confident in giving assurance that the Senate conferees on this measure will do all they can to develop with him and other Members a satisfactory solution. I

do want to emphasize the committee's interest in finding a solution which can indeed be enacted, so I trust that the Senator and his colleagues and staff will work energetically with the Foreign Relations Committee to find a solution before the conference on H.R. 6689.

As I have indicated to the Senator privately, I believe the Foreign Relations Committee conferees are prepared to accept any reasonable proposal from the Senator, so I believe we should expect that he will direct his staff to prepare recommended changes in the bill's provisions. Failing agreement on such recommendations, of course, we are prepared, as he indicated, to drop the matter in conference, and then the subject would have to be taken up on another bill.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his assurance, and relying on it, I will not press the matter at this time. It is my hope that if not before the conference, soon after it will be resolved satisfactorily.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, embedded within the State Department authorization bill we find a statement of U.S. policy envisioning the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea within 4 to 5 years. My amendment asks that the U.S. Senate go on record as favoring, instead, a policy of maintaining U.S. ground strength on the territory of our South Korean ally as long as this may be necessary. I believe that it is important that a policy decision of this magnitude be openly and freely debated. It is the purpose of my amendment to stimulate such a debate.

President Carter has recently announced his intention to withdraw American troops from South Korea. My amendment would contradict that policy. It will no doubt be objected, that the policy of a phased Korean withdrawal was initiated by the Republican administration of President Nixon. Even if that policy was correct initially, in 1977—after the calamitous fall of our Southeast Asian allies and many other negative occurrences—such a policy is clearly wrong.

In my remarks today I would like first to place this Korean decision in a larger context of the United States' position in the world, and then go on to a more specific discussion of the problems connected with a Korean withdrawal which we do not always seem to consider.

If we are wise, we will not make policy decisions on Korea in isolation from our overall foreign policy. As a matter of fact, we may make that decision without taking other factors into account, but when the decision is implemented, it will necessarily have complex ramifications for our position in the world. And a deliberative body like the Senate is in duty bound to consider all these factors.

In foreign policy, just as in defense, the really crucial matter is not the relative positions of adversaries at any particular time. It is, rather, the vectors of the power relations in the world. And

when we look at these vectors over last three decades or so, it is easy to see that they do not run in our favor.

The Korean situation is part of an overall conflict between the free world and the Communist world, a conflict which Willie Schlampp has very accurately characterized as an "international civil war." It is a war of a relatively new type: Often the front lines run, not between nation-states in the traditional sense, but within nations themselves. I can see this graphically in the present configurations of East and West Germany and North and South Korea, used to be visible as well in North and South Vietnam before the intensification of the Vietnamese conflict—a conflict which was initially presented to us as another "civil war."

The arena of the struggle between a free world and the Communist world is all pervasive. Much of the battle is ideological and political; sometimes it is fought at the level of conventional warfare; sometimes it erupts into conventional conflict, as when South Vietnam fell to naked aggression; and on all these there looms the prospect of nuclear conflict between the superpowers.

When we look thoughtfully at the map we discover that the trend of historic development over the last few decades has been the contraction of the free world and the concomitant expansion of Communist power. With the partial exception of Chile and Portugal, the entire recent development of the world has been in the direction of Communist hegemony, as one country after another has succumbed to Communist tyranny. Soviet power has spread further and further around the globe as we have chosen to retreat. I use the word advisedly. There is virtually no instance—not even in Southeast Asia—where we have been defeated militarily when we decided to stand. Rather, we have ourselves opted for a continuing policy of retreat.

In Europe, Eastern Europe remains firmly under Soviet control, while Communist parties are making serious gains in some respects unprecedented political inroads in the Western European countries. In Africa, one country after another embraces Marxism, and turns hostile to the interests of the free world. In Latin America, Cuba remains as intransigent as ever, encouraging terrorist movements throughout the region, and throughout Africa as well; Jamaica is evidently succumbing to the disease, and we are in danger even ourselves of giving up our vital control over the Panama Canal. In Asia, we have departed from almost all of the Southeast, we seem to be intent upon reducing, if not eliminating, our presence on Taiwan, our hold on bases in volatile Japan is somewhat tenuous, and now we propose voluntarily to weaken markedly our commitment to South Korea. And all this occurs against the background of an ominous Soviet military buildup which has—in my judgment—placed the United States in a condition of clear military and strategic inferiority. In addition, through the de-